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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 
78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1988), whereby a defendant in a 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment in a Circuit Court. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Circuit Court reversibly err in denying 
defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a 
search and seizure of a vehicle driven by the defendant? 
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TEXTS OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or afiBrmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I, § 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or afiBrmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-7-2, By peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the* physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been commit-
ted and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — 
Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for dangerous 
weapon ~ Grounds. A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily 
for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reason-
ably believes he or any other person is in danger. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890120-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the trial court's denial of 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD'S Motion to Suppress evidence at a hearing on 
February 10, 1989, the Honorable William A. Thorne presiding. 
Following the court's denial of the Motion to Suppress, Alvord 
entered a conditional plea of "no contest" to the charge of THEFT, a 
Class A misdemeanor. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 
App. 1988) (Conditional plea of no contest is "sensible and sound" 
way to preserve the suppression issue for appeal); see also Addendum 
D. Alvord was sentenced to serve a period of six months 
incarceration, with credit for time served since September 30, 
1988. As a result of his arrest, Alvord's parole was revoked, and 
he now resides at the Utah State Prison in Cedar City. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 30, 1988, at 3:25 a.m., Officer B. L. Smith of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department arrived at Wayne"s Texaco, 1302 
S. State Street, Salt Lake City, to investigate a gas theft that had 
been reported at about 3:24 a.m. (T: 26-28). Officer Smith 
interviewed the witness/complainant and prepared a police report 
(#88-093359) at the scene. According to the report, the suspect 
appeared to be a lone 30-year-old white male, clean-cut, driving a 
primer-gray 1968 Ford pickup truck, who put $7.69 worth of gas in 
the gas tank and drove off without paying for it. (T: 26-27; 
see also Police Report #88-093359). 
Officer Smith left Wayne's Texaco some time after 3:40 a.m. 
(T: 28). At about 4:00 a.m., Officer Smith observed a two-tone 1976 
Chevrolet pickup truck—white on top and the lower part gray 
(T: 28)—proceeding westbound on Downington (1825 South) toward 
State Street. According to Officer Smith, this was "probably 40 to 
45" minutes after the reported gas theft. (T: 28). Officer Smith 
pulled the pickup over at about 130 East 1825 South because, 
according to his police report, "I felt that at this hour, around 
0400, that this may have been the suspect truck and it was trying to 
elude me." (See Police Report #88-093365; see also T: 6). 
Officer Smith approached the pickup and observed two men 
inside: Alvord, who was 22 years old, and William D. Parker, who 
was 19. Officer Smith demanded to see Alvord's driver license, and 
looked inside the pickup to observe that the gas gauge registered 
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"just above empty." (See Police Report #88-093365; see also T: 
31). Officer Smith determined at that point that Alvord had not 
committed the gas theft. (T: 31; 34). Officer Smith also observed 
scrap metal in the bed of the pickup and two pairs of gloves. 
(T: 32). These observations were not made until after the stop of 
the pickup. (T: 7; 34). According to Officer Smith, "I suspected 
at that point that if they were not the failure to pay suspects that 
they might have been dumpster jumping [i.e./ stealing scrap 
metal]." (See Police Report #88-093365; see also T: 11; 32). 
Officer Smith had received no reports of any metal thefts at that 
time. (T: 31; 49). 
Officer Smith radioed for a backup to assist in the 
investigation of a metals theft. (T: 50). Sergeant Robert Gillies, 
Salt Lake City Police Department, arrived 3 or 4 minutes after 
Officer Smith. (T: 50). Officer Smith then questioned Alvord and 
Parker, and ran a warrants and criminal history check on both. 
Neither Alvord nor Parker had outstanding warrants. Officer Smith 
ascertained that Alvord had a "1975 theft arrest" and was on parole 
for burglary. (See Police Report #88-093365; see also T: 16). 
Sergeant Gillies looked into the bed of the pickup and found a box 
with the printed name on it of "Jakeman Enterprises," a metals 
company located at 328 W. Gregson Avenue (3050 South). (T: 21). 
Sergeant Gillies then proceeded to the Jakeman Enterprises property 
to "determined if a burglary had occurred," while Officer Smith 
detained Alvord and Parker at the scene. (See Police Report 
#88-093365; see also T: 21/ 44). Sergeant Gillies searched the 
area, (T: 44-46). Later on, he radioed Officer Smith back at the 
scene of the stop and described footprints he discovered at Jakeman 
Enterprises. Officer Smith then inspected the soles of Alvord's and 
Parker's shoes. (See Police Report #88-093365; see also T: 13-14). 
Officer Smith asked Parker if they had committed a theft. According 
to Officer Smith, Parker responded "that was just about it." (See 
Police Report #88-093365). Officer Smith (with Officer Miller) then 
placed Alvord and Parker under arrest for Larceny ("primary 
offense") and Possession of Stolen Property ("secondary offense") 
and about 4:25 a.m. (See Police Report #88-093365; see also 
T. 21-23). 
Officer Smith then administered "Miranda warnings" to 
Parker and took a statement. (See Police Report #88-093365). The 
truck was impounded with a hold for larceny detectives. Id. 
Alvord's and Parker's shoes, the gloves, the metal and the boxes 
were seized as evidence, !£. Sergeant Gillies contacted an agent 
of Jakeman Enterprises who met him at the property and indicated 
some metal was missing from the yard. (T: 46-47). The time 
sequence described by Sergeant Gillies indicates that this meeting 
took place after Parker and Alvord had been arrested. (T. 45-47). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Alvord appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to 
Suppress evidence on several grounds. First, Alvord contends that 
Officer Smith lacked reasonable suspicion of a gas theft, pursuant 
to § 77-7-15 of Utah Code (1982), to justify the initial stop of the 
vehicle he was driving. Second, Alvord contends that he was 
illegally detained by Officer Smith after the initial stop because 
(1) the detention exceeded the "brief investigatory stop" allowed 
pursuant to § 77-7-15 of the Utah Code (1982) (quoting State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)); and (2) Officer Smith 
lacked reasonable suspicion of a metals theft by Alvord, pursuant to 
§ 77-7-15 of the Utah Code (1982). Third, Officer Smith lacked 
reasonable cause to search and arrest Alvord, pursuant to § 77-7-2 
of the Utah Code (1988). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OFFICER SMITH LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION OF 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO JUSTIFY THE INITIAL STOP OF 
ALVORD'S VEHICLE. 
The fourth amendment to United States Constitution protects 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. . . .n 
The Utah Constitution, in article I, § 14, provides this same 
guarantee with essentially the same language. Section 77-7-15 of 
the Utah Code Ann. (1982) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop 
and question suspect - Grounds. A peace 
officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
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The stopping of an automobile and detention of its 
occupants constitute a "seizure" and must therefore comport with 
constitutional standards. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah 
App. 1988)(citations omitted). In determining whether 
constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion exists to justify 
seizure of a vehicle, courts look to the facts of each case. Id. 
Officer Smith stopped Alvord's vehicle because "I thought 
it was the suspect in the gas theft and I wanted to make further 
investigation." (T: 6). Officer Smith wrote in his police report: 
I spotted a primer gray pickup, not new, 
westbound on Downington towards State 
Street. I pulled around the corner in time 
to see the truck drive south down an alley 
between Edison and 200 East. I felt that at 
this hour, around 0400, that this may have 
been the suspect truck and it was trying to 
elude me. I pulled the truck over midway 
down the alley. 
(See Police Report #88-093365). Alvord's vehicle was not cited for 
a traffic violation. Officer Smith suspected Alvord had committed 
the gas theft because of (1) the time of day; (2) the neighborhood 
where he was driving; (3) the appearance of his vehicle; and (4) the 
reported gas theft about 45 minutes earlier. These facts do not 
create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the 
stop. 
-6 -
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah App. 1987), a 
police officer detained three individuals because (1) it was a 
high-crime area; (2) the lateness of the hour (3:30 a.m.); (3) the 
apparent nervous conduct of the trio; and (4) the "suspicious" nylon 
knapsack Trujillo carried. The officer searched Trujillo and found 
a knife. Trujillo was on parole at that time, and at trial was 
convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because the 
totality of circumstances preceding the stop of Trujillo would not 
support a reasonable suspicion that Trujillo was involved in 
criminal conduct. I^d. at 89. In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 
675 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's 
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop. There, a 
police officer stopped a slowly moving vehicle with out-of-state 
license plates in a neighborhood where a rash of burglaries had 
recently occurred. The Court reasoned: 
. . . the officer here had no reasonable 
suspicion to make an investigatory stop. 
The stop was based merely on the fact that a 
car with out-of-state license plates was 
moving slowly through a neighborhood late at 
night [3:00 a.m.]. The officer had no 
objective facts on which to base a 
reasonable suspicion that the men were 
involved in criminal activity. 
As in Trujillo and Carpena, the time of day and the neighborhood 
where Alvord was driving do not create a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity by Alvord. 
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In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985), two 
individuals were seen walking at about 11:00 p.m. in a neighborhood 
where a burglary had been reported 30 minutes earlier. They 
"stared" at the officer. They were again seen at 1:40 a.m. and were 
detained and searched. Stolen property was recovered and Swanigan 
was convicted of burglary. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and suppressed the evidence because: 
The stop was based solely on a description 
by a fellow officer who had observed the two 
walking along the street at a late hour in 
an area where recent burglaries had been 
reported. Neither officer had any knowledge 
that defendant and his companion had been at 
the scene of the crime. The officers had 
not observed the men engaged in any unlawful 
or suspicious activity. 
Ibid. As in Swanigan, the fact that a crime had been recently 
reported does not broaden the perameters of the "reasonable 
suspicion" of criminal activity by Alvord that is required to 
justify the stop of his vehicle. Nor, does a description if, as in 
Swanigan, the description is inadequate. 
Officer Smith testified at the suppression hearing that he 
stopped Alvord's vehicle because it "matched" the description of the 
vehicle involved in a gas theft that had been reported at least 36 
minutes earlier. (T: 6; 28). On cross-examination, Officer Smith 
admitted that Alvord's pickup did not match the pickup suspected of 
the gas theft. (T: 26-31). Officer Smith also admitted that he 
"had all available information" and "knew better than anyone else 
about that gas theft case" because he was the responding officer and 
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had prepared the police report (#88-93359) from his own 
investigation. (T: 36). The gas-theft vehicle was a primer-gray 
1968 Ford pickup. (T: 27). Alvord's vehicle was a 1976 Chevrolet 
pickup, two-tone with a white top and gray below. (T: 28). Officer 
Smith first cited Alvord's vehicle about seven blocks from the scene 
of the gas theft, and in Officer Smith's estimation at least 40 to 
45 minutes after the gas theft had occurred. (T: 28). Officer 
Smith also knew that the gas theft had been committed by a lone 
30-year-old man. (T: 26). Alvord's vehicle had two passengers: 
Alvord, who was 22, and Parker who was 19. (T: 29-30). 
These facts should have been readily apparent prior to the 
stop. It was not reasonable, based on these facts, for Officer 
Smith to suspect that Alvord's vehicle had been involved in the gas 
theft. The descriptions do not match. Officer Smith testified that 
he did not realize Alvord was driving a Chevrolet pickup—rather 
than a Ford pickup—even though that fact is contained in his police 
report (#88-093365). (T: 29-31). This is not credible testimony 
because such a fact should be readily apparent to a reasonable and 
experienced traffic officer. If, on the other hand, Officer Smith 
did not know what make of vehicle Alvord was driving, he could not 
form a reasonable suspicion that Alvord's vehicle was the 1968 Ford 
pickup that he reported had been involved in the gas theft earlier 
that morning. 
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Further, the detention of Alvord cannot be justified by the 
evidence discovered after the stop: that is, the gloves, the scrap 
metal, the box with "Jakeman Enterprises" printed on it, and the 
identification of Alvord and Parker. In State v. Baird, Case No, 
870259-CA (Utah App. 1988), the Court of Appeals reversed the 
defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
because the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify 
stopping the defendant's vehicle. The court wrote: 
The State attempted to justify the stop by 
the after-discovered evidence of new tires 
and shocks, a twisted-off gas cap, the jack 
in the back seat, the defendant's confusion 
about ownership of the car, and the smell of 
marijuana. While this may have justified a 
further inquiry of the driver after a valid 
stop, such articulable suspicion must be 
present at the time of the stop and must be 
the reason for the stop. In this case, no 
reasonable or articulable suspicion existed 
to justify the stop. The evidence used to 
convict defendant was derived by 
exploitation of the impermissible stop. 
Id. at 4. This reasoning should be applied to suppress the evidence 
gathered against Alvord. 
Officer Smith stopped Alvord's two-tone gray and white 1976 
Chevrolet pickup because it was late at night and seven blocks from 
where a man had committed a gas theft in a primer-gray 1968 Ford 
pickup. These facts do not create a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity by the occupants of Alvord's vehicle. Without a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, pursuant to § 77-7-15 of 
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the Utah Code (1982), the stop of Alvord's vehicle was illegal and 
all evidence derived from it must be suppressed. State v. Harris, 
671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983) (citing Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 
(1963)). 
POINT II 
OFFICER SMITH ILLEGALLY DETAINED 
ALVORD AFTER THE INITIAL STOP. 
After stopping Alvord's vehicle, Officer Smith approached, 
asked for Alvord's driver license and and peered inside the car to 
look at the gas gauge. (T: 7). It registered "just barely above 
empty." (T: 7). Officer Smith also saw two pairs of gloves. (T: 
32-33). Looking at the gas gauge, Officer Smith determined that 
Alvord and Parker had not committed the gas theft for which he had 
stopped them. (T: 31). Officer Smith also observed at this time 
scrap metal and boxes in the bed of the pickup. (T: 7). 
Officer Smith began to question Alvord about the scrap 
metal. (T: 15). According to Officer Smith, Alvord responded that 
he had gotten the metal from odd jobs over the past week. (T: 16). 
At this point, Officer Smith suspected that the metal was stolen: 
A. Well, when I had stopped the vehicle, I 
had noticed something between both of them 
in the bed of the truck, and it didn't gel, 
4:00 o'clock in the morning, didn't gel. 
Q. And what do you mean, it didn't? 
A. It didn't - - didn't make sense; 4:00 
o'clock in the morning, having a pickup 
truck loaded with property that is easily 
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gotten rid of on the street, 8:30 in the 
morning at any of the iocal salvage yards in 
the valley. It just didn't make sense that 
somebody would keep something worth cash 
money for a week, if he's not employed. 
(T: 19-20). Officer Smith suspected a metals theft based on 
observations make after the stop. (T: 34). Officer Smith was not 
aware of any reports of recent metals thefts. (T: 31). Officer 
Smith and Sergeant Gillies admitted, on cross-examination, that it 
is not a crime to have scrap metal in the bed of a truck. (T: 32; 
51). Nevertheless, Alvord was detained for investigation of metals 
theft. (T: 33-34; 49-50). 
A. ALVORD'S DETENTION EXCEEDED THE BRIEF INVESTIGATORY 
STOP PERMITTED UNDER § 77-7-15 OF THE UTAH CODE (1982). The Utah 
Supreme Court holds that "A brief investigatory stop of an 
individual by police officers is permissible when the officers 'have 
a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity.1" Swanigan, 699 P.2d 
at 719 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In the case at bar, 
Officer Smith determined immediately after the stop that Alvord had 
not committed the gas theft, yet he detained Alvord to investigate a 
suspected unrelated crime that had not been reported. Thus, even if 
the initial stop of Alvord is viewed as reasonable, the extended 
detention exceeds the "brief investigatory stop" it would allow. 
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See also State v, Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987)("detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"). For this reason, the detention of Alvord 
following the stop cannot be justified on the basis of the initial 
stop. 
B. EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AFTER THE STOP DOES NOT CREATE A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BY ALVORD UNDER § 77-7-15 
OF THE UTAH CODE (1982). Section § 77-7-15 of the Utah Code (1982) 
permits a peace officer to stop and question a person when he has a 
reasonable suspicion that he has committed a crime. To justify a 
detention under this standard, a police officer must articulate 
objective facts upon which his suspicions are based. Deitman, 739 
P.2d at 617; 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d at 719. Here, Officer Smith suspected a metals 
theft and detained Alvord based on the following facts: (1) the 
scrap metal in the truck bed; and (2) the two pairs of gloves. (See 
Police Report #88-093365). Officer Smith testified to the following: 
Q. And so your testimony is then you 
believe Mr. Alvord had stolen that metal 
simply because—well, why don't you tell us 
again. Why did you think he had stolen that 
metal, since it's not a crime to have metal 
in a truck and to be driving on the street 
at 4:00 a.m.? 
A. Well, it didn't happened all at once. 
Like I say, it was the totality of 
circumstances; physical evidence at the 
scene, Sergeant Gillies going to the scene 
of the name that was on the cardboard boxes, 
the newness of the aluminum, and it did not 
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appear to be scrap, driving down an alley, 
the time, they had gloves between the both 
of them in the bed of the pickup truck which 
I noticed when I went up it's also an older 
model vehicle, it was a borrowed vehicle, 
and the prior criminal history and the fact 
that the gentleman was on parole. The other 
thing was the passenger was supposed to go 
in the military the following day. 
(T. 32-33). Some of these facts were not apparent to Officer Smith 
when he formed a suspicion of a metals theft; they are facts that 
became apparent only after the decision to detain Alvord to 
investigate a metals theft. After-discovered evidence cannot create 
a "reasonable suspicion" to justify the detention to investigate 
Baird, Case No. 870259-CA at 4. Thus, the only articulable facts 
upon which Officer Smith's suspicion of a metal theft was based were 
(1) time of day; (2) new-looking aluminum scraps in the truck bed; 
(3) gloves in the truck; and (4) driving down an alley in a 
residential neighborhood. These facts do not create a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675; Swanigan, 
699 P.2d at 719; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89-90. The detention was 
based on a mere hunch. For this reason, the detention of Alvord— 
the "stop" to investigate a metals theft—was illegal under 
§ 77-7-15 of the Utah Code (1982). 
POINT III 
OFFICER SMITH LACKED REASONABLE CAUSE TO 
SEARCH AND ARREST ALVORD. 
Officer Smith conducted several warrantless and 
nonconsensual searches of Alvord, Parker and their vehicle. First, 
when he inspected the gas gauge and discovered the gloves. (T: 7; 
19; 32). Second, when he inspected the scrap metal and the printed 
boxes in the truck bed. (T: 7;10). Third, when he inspected the 
soles of Alvord's and Parker's shoes for comparison with footprints 
discovered at Jakeman Enterprises. (T: 13-14). There is no 
evidence that Alvord ever consented to the initial stop, the 
detention or the searches. Cf., Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617 (Defendant 
gave verbal consent to car search). Alvord's compliance with 
Officer Smith resulted from Alvord's belief that he was not free to 
object. 
These searches exceed the "weapons pat down" allowed under 
§ 77-7-16 of the Utah Code (1982). A warrantless nonconsensual 
search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized 
exception to the constitutional requirement of a warrant. U.S. 
Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14. State v. Holmes, 107 
Utah Adv. Rep. 74, 76 (Utah App. 1989). 
Officer Smith testified that the metal "was in plain 
view." (T: 7). The State may argue that the "plain view exception" 
to the warrant requirement applies here to the search of the vehicle 
and discovery of the metal in the bed and the gloves in the truck. 
For the plain view exception to apply, three requirements must be 
met: (1) lawful presence of Officer Smith; (2) evidence in plain 
view; and (3) evidence which is clearly incriminating. Holmes at 76. 
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On the facts of this case, the first prong fails because 
Officer Smith lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—• 
i.e., the gas theft—to justify the initial stop of Alvord's 
vehicle. Because the stop was not legal under § 77-7-15 of the Utah 
Code (1982), the presence of Officer Smith was not lawful. Further, 
the third prong fails because gloves and scrap metal are not 
"clearly incriminating." This phrase has been defined as "probable 
cause to associate the property with criminal activity." Holmes at 
76. There is nothing inherently incriminating about scrap metal and 
gloves in a truck. This Court ruled in Holmes that furtive movement 
and efforts to conceal did not elevate the object seized there to 
the status of "clearly incriminating" evidence. Similarly here the 
neighborhood and time of day do not elevate the metal and gloves to 
the status of "clearly incriminating" evidence. Because the plain 
view exception does not apply, the car search was unreasonable per 
se. 
It cannot be argued convincingly that the plain view 
exception applies to inspecting the soles of Alvord's and Parker's 
shoes. However, the State may argue that the searches were 
justified as incident to a valid arrest. Officer Smith testified 
that he arrested Alvord and Parker after searching the car and 
inspecting the soles of their shoes. (T: 23). Thus, there was no 
arrest when these searches were conducted. For this reason, these 
searches—warrantless and nonconsensual—were unreasonable per se. 
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The State may argue that an "arrest" occurred prior to the 
searches and prior to Officer Smithfs formal statement of arrest, 
because a "seizure" had occurred and Alvord was not free to leave. 
However, the arrest must be lawful for the warrant exception to 
apply. U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). The general 
rule is that every arrest, and every seizing having the essential 
attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is 
supported by probable cause Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 
(1981). Section 77-7-2 of the Utah Code (1988) codifies this rule: 
77-7-2. By peace officers. A peace 
officer may make an arrest under authority of 
a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a 
person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or 
attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer; "presence" includes all of the 
physical senses or any device that enhances 
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations of 
any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has a reasonable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed and has 
reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
Here, Alvord was charged with Theft, a Class A misdemeanor. Because 
that crime was not "committed or attempted" in the presence of 
Officer Smith, the appropriate analysis here falls under subsection 
(3). 
Officer Smith did not have reasonable cause to believe 
Alvord had committed a metals theft prior to discovering the metal 
in the truck and inspecting the soles of Alvord's and Parker's 
shoes. There had been no report of a theft at Jakeman Enterprises. 
(T: 31). For this reason it cannot be argued convincingly under 
subsection (3) that a lawful arrest occurred prior to these searches. 
Further, Officer Smith did not have reasonable cause to 
believe Alvord had committed a metals theft at the time he formally 
arrested him. A theft had not been reported at Jakeman 
Enterprises. (T. 31). A theft was not committed or attempted in 
the presence of Officer Smith. Agents from Jakeman Enterprises were 
not contacted until after the arrest. (T: 45-47). Officer Smith 
and Sergeant Gillies admitted on cross-examination that it is not a 
crime to have metal in the bed of a truck. (T: 32; 51). Nor, is it 
a crime to drive on a public roadway at 4:00 a.m. (T: 32-51). The 
evidence of footprints is meaningless without comparison to the 
soles of Alvord's and Parker's shoes, and that comparison was 
accomplished by an illegal search. Parker allegedly admitted the 
theft under custodial interrogation by Officer Smith, before the 
arrest and before any Miranda warning. (T: 14-15; see also Police 
Report #88-093365). That admission was illegally derived, and this 
Court should not consider it a valid factor in the formation of a 
reasonable cause to arrest. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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The warrantless nonconsensual vehicle search and personal 
search are unreasonable per se because they are not justified by a 
recognized exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. All 
evidence subsequently seized - including the metal, the gloves, the 
footprints comparison - is inadmissible as a derivative of the 
illegal search. Holmes, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. at 77. Further, the 
arrest of Alvord was illegal because it was not based on a 
reasonable cause to believe that Alvord had engaged in criminal 
activity. As such, all evidence seized pursuant to that arrest is 
inadmissible against Alvord. Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
The initial stop of Alvord's vehicle was not supported by a 
reasonable suspicion, pursuant to § 77-7-15 of the Utah Code (1982), 
that Alvord had committed the gas theft for which he was stopped. 
As such, it constitutes an unreasonable seizure. U.S. Const, amend. 
IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14. All evidence derived therefrom is 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings against him. 
The subsequent detention of Alvord to investigate a metals 
theft is also not supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. It constitutes an unreasonable seizure. U.S. Const, 
amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14. All evidence derived therefrom 
is inadmissible in criminal proceedings against Alvord. 
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The arrest of Alvord — whether it occurred before or after 
the search of his vehicle and person — was not supported by 
"reasonable cause" pursuant to § 77-7-2 of Utah Code (1988). 
Further, the warrantless nonconsensual searches were per se 
unreasonable and unjustified by any recognized exception to the 
constitutional requirements of a warrant. U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. For these reasons all evidence derived 
pursuant to the searches and arrest is inadmissible against Alvord. 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the appellant, 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD, respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
lower court's denial of his Motion to Suppress evidence, allow him 
to withdraw his conditional plea of "no contest" to the charge of 
Theft pursuant to State v. Sery and order that the charge be 
dismissed against him. 
Respectfully submitted this / / day of June, 1989. 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT / J 
Attorney for Appellarft^/ 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Virginia 
Christensen, South Valley County Attorney's Office, 2001 South State 
Street, Suite S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this / ^ 
day of June, 1989. 
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SGT GILLIES RESPONDED. 
I HAS JUST r l N l S t l t U I t V C i l iHAl XNtt Jt rniLUKC I U r* • run a n j m >»«t™i.-
:AR CARE CENTER*. 1302 S JH STATE/. 83-93359. THE ST ECT VEHICLE WAS A 
>RIHER 6RAY 63-69 POSSIBLY FORD PICKUP WITH A CLEAN CUT L00KIN6 HAN FOR 
'HE DRIVER. 
AFTER COMPLETING THE REPORT I PROCEEDED DOWN STATE STREET UITH THE 
INTENTION OF LOOKING AT THE HOTELS FOR THE TRUCK. I VENT EAST ON 
IESTIUNISTER TO 200 EAST AND THEN NORTH WHEN I SPOTTED A PRIMER GRAY 
>ICKUP, NOT NEW* WESTBOUND ON DQWNINGTQN TOWARDS STATE STREET. I PULLED 
IROUND THE CORNER IN TINE TO SEE THE TRUCK DRIVE SOUTH DOWN AN ALLEY 
IETWEEH EDISON AND 200 EAST. I FELT THAT AT THIS HOUR, AROUND 0400, THAT 
THIS NAY HAVE SEEN THE SUSPECT TRUCK AND IT WAS TRYING TO ELUDE ME. I 
'ULLED THE TRUCK OVER MIDWAY DOWN THE ALLEY. 
AS I WALKED UP TO THE TRUCK I NOTICED THERE WERE TWO INDIVIDUALS IN THE 
TRUCK AND THAT THE BED WAS OVERLOADED WITH NEW LOOKING ALUMINUM WHICH 
IOULD BE WORTH HONEY AT A SALVAGE YARD. AS I APPROACHED THE DRIVER I ASKED I! 
FOR A DRIVER'S LICENSE AND LOOKED INSIDE TO OBSERVE HIS GAS GAUGE WAS JUST ! 
IBOVE EMPTY. I ALSO SAW, IN BETWEEN BOTH, ON THE SEAT, TWO PAIRS OF ! 
ILOVES. I SUSPECTED AT THAT POINT THAT IF THEY WERE NOT THE FAILURE TO PAY !! 
SUSPECTS THAT THEY NI6HT HAVE BEEN DUMPSTER JUHPING. THIS IS THE TERN USED ! 
•OR PEOPLE WHO SCAVENGE ALUMINUM AND OTHER METALS FOR SALVAGE PR I ! 
:ES. 
WHILE RUNNING WANTS AND CRIMINAL HISTORY OH BOTH I ASKED NIKE WHERE HE 
IAO GOT THE PROPERTY IN THE BED OF THE TRUCK. HE SAID FROM HIS ODD JOBS. I 
ISKEO HIS A SECOND TINE AND HE REPLIED THE SANE. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY CANE BACK THAT SLC HAD A 1975 THEFT ARREST FOR NIKE 
IND I HAD THEM CHECK THE PAROLE 800K AND NIKE CARE BACK ON PAROLE FOR 
3URGLARY AT THE PRESENT TINE. JUST PRIOR TO THIS SGT GILLIES AND OFFICER 
LYNN FULLER WHO HAD COKE TO ASSIST HAD ADVISED NE THAT THERE WAS A NAME 
IND ADDRESS ON THE BOXES IN THE BED OF THE TRUCK. SGT GILLIES HAD SPOTTED 
THIS AND SAID HE WOULD GO TO THE SCENE AND DETERMINE IF A BURGLARY HAD 
OCCURRED. THIS LOCATION WAS 2-3 MILES AWAY. 
OFFICER MILLER WAS FIELDCARDIN6 PARKER WHILE I ASKED MIKE TO STEP 8ACK TO 
THE FRONT OF MY CAR AND I ASKED HIM WHERE HE WAS WORKING FOR THE 
FIELDCARD. HE TOLD HE HE WASN'T WORKING. I THEN ASKED HIM ABOUT THE STUFF 
IN THE BED OF THE TRUCK AGAIN AND ASKED HIM JUST WHEN HE HAD OBTAINED IT 
SINCE HE TOLD ME HE HAD BORROWED THE TRUCK FROM A FRIEND. 
MIKE SAID HE HAD GOT IT AT ODD JOBS IN OGDEN AND LAYTON AND HE HAD HAD 
THE STUFF FOR ABOUT A WEEK. I TOLD HIM.THAT I FOUND THAT HARD TO BELIEVE 
BECAUSE THAT PROPERTY WAS WORTH CASH MONEY AT SALVAGE YARDS AND I CAN'T 
SEE IT SITTING IN THE 
BED OF AN OPEN PICKUP TRUCK. HE TOLD NE HIS PO WAS MIKE SPANOS. THERE WAS ! 
NO WEATHER SP0TTIN6 ON THE ALUMINUM IN THE BED OF THE TRUCK AND IT LOOKED ! 
LIKE IT HAD NOT BEEN THERE VERY LONG. ! 
SGT GILLIES CALLED ME ON THE RADIO AND SAID THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE 
FRESH DRAG MARKS IN THE YARD AND FOOTPRINTS. HE ASKED ME TO DESCRIBE THE 
FOOTPRINTS OF EACH OF ALVORD AND PARKER AND I ASKED EACH TO SHOW ME THEIR 
SOLES. I DESCRIBED BOTH AMD SGT GILLIES ADVISED HE THAT THEY FIT THE 
PRINTS IN THE YARD OF THIS BUSINESS CALLED JAKENAN ENTERPRISES. 
I THEN TOLD PARKER THAT I BELIEVED THEY HAD JUST COMMITTED A THEFT IN 
SOUTH SALT LAKE AND ASKED HIM IF THAT WAS CORRECT AND HE TOLD ME THAT THAT 
WAS JUST ABOUT IT. 
I THEN PLACED PARKER MNDER ARREST AND (ASKED RILfR TO DO THE SARE WITH ! 
LVORD. I ASKED RILLER J INTERVIEW ALVORD WHILE I ID THE SAME WITH ! 
IRKER. ! 
POST HIRANDA# PARKER CONFESSED TELLING RE THET HAD JUST CO«E FROR SSL ! 
MD DOING THE THEFT. THET CLIRBED OVER THE FENCE AND TOOK THE PROPERTY ! 
fcOR A TRAILER IN THE:YARD AND THIS WAS HIS FIRST TIRE GOING OUT:WITH HIKE ! 
«D HE HAS 60IN6 TO BOOTCARP ON MONDAY. HE HAD BEEN WITH HIKE HOST OF THE ! 
IT AND THE TRUCK HAS BORROWED AND THEY HAD BEEN CRUISING LOOKING FOR A ! 
LACE TO HIT. HIKE LIVES AT•171< WESTMINISTER HITH DEVON 0* NEIL. ! 
f 
IN ALVORD"S WALLET WERE THREE RECEIPTS FROM DIFFERENT SALVAGE YARDS. ! 
)PIES ARE WITH THE CASE. ALVORD WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH OFFICER RILLER ! 
ID A BINOLE OF SUSPECTED COCAINE WAS FOUND IN HIS WALLET. OFFICER RILLER f 
INDLED THAT CASE. ! 
! 
THE TRUCK WAS IMPOUNDED WITH A HOLD FOR LARCENY DETECTIVES. SST GILLIES ! 
1NTACTED THE OWNER AND SOUTH SALT LAKE* OFFICER HOLLAND* 8S-?12044# ! 
INDLED THE INVESTIGATION. SOCO BOLLWINKEL'TOOK PICTURES OF THE FOOTPRINTS ! 
ID THE TRUCK WITH £ THE PROPERTY . IV IT SINCE SSL DID NOT: HAVE THAT ! 
IPABILITY AT THIS TIRE. THE OWNER DID TELL S6T.GILLIES THAT THERE ! 
PPEARED TO BE $200.00 WORTH OF PROPERTY IN,THE TRUCK AT A COST OF $.55 ! 
:R POUND. ! 
I 
PARKER IS COOPERATIVE. AGENT LARRY KELLY WAS CONTACTED FROR APtP AND ! 
IVEN THE INFORMATION. A COPT OF THIS REPORT WAS-TAKEN TO THE 6TH FLOOR AT * 
ri5 9/30/38. ! 
! 
APSP PLANS TO DO A HONE'VISIT AT ALVORD'S THIS DATE. THEY:HAD VISITED ! 
[M THIS PREVIOUS MONDAY WITH NO PROBLEMS. ! 
S6T GILLIES AND OFFICER MILLER WILL CLEAR REPORTS AS TO THEIR ACTION.. ! 
i 
THE GLOVES WERE LEFT IN THE TRUCK AS WAS THE STOLEN PROPERTY. THE f 
1IVER HAS ASKED TO PUT THE TRUCK INSIDE THE BUILDING. I PLACED THE SHOES ! 
F BOTH PARTIES INTO EVIDENCE FOR COMPARISON BY I SSL TO THE PHOTOS TAKEN AT ! 
IE SCENE. ! 
• 
NO FURTHER ACTION. ! 
OFFICER INFORMATION FIELD - OF CASE 8 8 - 0 9 3 3 6 5 
» NO./DIV ! REPORTING OFFICER ! ASSISTING OFFICERS ID NO. /DIV. ! 
I3P ' S M I T H ! • 
•PORT STATUS !.CLEARANCE: t !.AGE GROUP: I 
ISE CLOSED? !.EXCEPT?: UNF ARREST? ! ADULT? JUVENILE? ! 
•S ! „ YES ! , Y E S ! 
ECE1VED IN RECORDS ! COMPUTERENTRYID ! 
ME TIRE ! ! 
7 / 3 0 / 8 3 0 7 : 5 7 *! 526R ! 
ADDENDUM C 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
S a l t Lake Lega l Defender A s s o c i a t i o n 
A t t o r n e y for Defendan t 
424 Eas t 500 S o u t h , S u i t e 300 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 881003780MC 
CAO 88-3-04531 
The defendant, MICHAEL W. ALVORD, hereby moves to suppress 
all evidence seized and all admissions made as a result of his 
detention and arrest by officers of the Salt Lake Police Department 
on the morning of September 30, 1988. 
Defendant bases this Motion on the grounds that (1) The 
defendant was illegally detained in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-15; See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah 1988); (2) 
The defendant's vehicle was illegally searched, without a warrant or 
consent^in violation of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, §14, and the 
United States Constitution, Amendments IV and XIV. See Sie rra at 
977; and (3) The defendant was illegally arrested, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 (1953 as amended), and the United States 
Constitution, Amendments IV and XIV. 
Dated t h i s day of December, 1988. 
/ - " > - > 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 7 7 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT Ly 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE SOUTH VALLEY COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE: 
Please take notice that the above-entitled matter will come 
on for hearing on the ____________ day of , 198 
at the hour of , before the Honorable William A. 
Thorne . Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this ________ day of , 1988. 
WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Circuit Court Judge 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Sa l t Lake 
County A t t o r n e y ' s Of f i ce , 2001 South S ta te S t r e e t , #3700, S a l t Lake 
C i t y , Utah 84190-1200 t h i s p *? day of December, 1988. 
ADDENDUM D 
AFFIDAVITS OF CONSENT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD, 
Defendant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 
Case No. 881003780MC 
The State of Utah by and through Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney Virginia Christensen, agrees to allow defendant MICHAEL W. 
ALVORD to enter a conditional plea of no contest in the 
above-enumerated case, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 
(Utah App* 1988), in order tot (1) preserve his right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence; and 
(2) withdraw the plea if it is determined on appeal that the Motion 
to Suppress should have been granted. 
DATED this 
yn 
day of , 1989. 
VIRGINIA CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL W. ALVORD, 
De fe ndant/Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT 
Case No. 890120-CA 
The State of Utah by and through Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney Virginia Christensen, agrees to allow defendant MICHAEL W. 
ALVORD to have entered a conditional plea of no contest with the 
trial court in the above-enume rated case, pursuant to State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988), in order to: (1) preserve his 
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress 
Evidence; and (2) withdraw the plea if it is determined on appeal 
that the Motion to Suppress should have been granted. 
DATED th is /sj day of 1989. 
riRGMIIA CHRISTENSEN 
Depuey County Attorney 
